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Abstract:  James Ahiakpor's critique of our 2002 work on the relationship between a 
certain 1932 Harvard Memorandum on anti-depression policies and the 1932 Harris 
Foundation Manifesto dealing with the same issues misses the significance of these 
documents, and of the relationships between them, both for the literature of the time, and 
for later debates about the origins of 1930s Chicago ideas about monetary economics. He 
is correct to locate these documents in a more general quantity theoretic tradition, but his 
discussion here is marred by a serious misunderstanding of  the so-called forced saving 
doctrine and its place in that tradition. Finally, Ahiakpor fails to appreciate that the 
absence of positive policy proposals from the 1934 Harvard studies of The Economics of 
the Recovery Program, a point which he himself notes, is a major contributing factor to 
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James Ahiakpor's critique of our work (David Laidler and Roger Sandilands, 2002) on 
some specific links between monetary thought at Harvard and Chicago in the early 1930s 
is wide ranging and provocative. He makes much of the indisputable, and undisputed 
(certainly by us) point that monetary thought in both places drew on a common quantity-
theoretic heritage whose lineage can be traced back at least to David Hume (1752). But 
he goes further than this, suggesting that this common heritage alone, rather than any 
more direct influence, links the contents of a Memorandum, prepared at Harvard in 
January 1932 by Lauchlin Currie, Paul T. Ellsworth and Harry D. White (1932 [2002]), 
which, alongside proposals for dealing with international indebtedness, urged the 
implementation of domestic anti-depression policies based on monetary and fiscal 
expansion, and the well known Manifesto bearing similar messages that emerged from a 
conference held at the University of Chicago later that month under the auspices of the 
Harris Foundation. 
 Ahiakpor notes that "Milton Friedman had the occasion to point to the common 
theoretical heritage for the Harvard and Chicago documents, but he did not" (p. 4) and 
then tells his readers that his own paper “seeks to fill the gap" that Friedman left. Had 
Ahiakpor paused to consider why so resourceful and enthusiastic a controversialist as 
Friedman failed to grasp this apparent opportunity, however, he might have noticed that 
his own supposedly gap-filling arguments, far from damaging the case we made, simply 
miss its point at a number of crucial stages. This, we conjecture, might be why Friedman 
did not advance anything resembling them. 
 In what follows, we shall argue successively: (i) that Ahiakpor has misunderstood 
how our work fits in to the debate about the significance of the so-called "Chicago 
Tradition" for the economic thought of the 1930s; (ii) that he has confused conventional 
quantity theoretic analysis of the transmission mechanism linking changes in the quantity 
of money to changes in such real variables as output and employment, as well as to the 
price level, with the forced-saving doctrine which in the 1930s had come to play a central 
role in the fundamentally anti-quantity theoretic economics of such "Austrian" thinkers as 
Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, and Lionel Robbins, which was represented at 
the Harris conference by Gottfried von Haberler; (iii) that he has underestimated the 
influence on contemporary policy of exponents of the "needs of trade" theory of 
monetary policy, represented at the Harris conference by Henry Parker Willis, and has 
failed to appreciate the central weakness of the slightly later Harvard volume on The 
Economics of the Recovery Program (Brown et al 1934) and the importance of this 
weakness for the subsequent development of macroeconomics at that University.  
 
(i) The Debate about the Chicago Tradition 
 
Debate about the so-called Chicago Tradition has by now gone on with varying intensity 
for more than half a century, and has generated a literature far too voluminous and 
complex to survey here. A brief summary of some of its salient features is, however, 
required. Its starting point was Milton Friedman's (1956) claim that from the 1930s 
onwards, the University of Chicago had been home to an oral tradition centered on a 
version of the quantity theory of money formulated not as a theory linking the behaviour 
of prices to the supply of money, but as a theory of the demand for money. After an 
unfortunately long time-lag, Don Patinkin (1969) would dispute this claim, arguing that 
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the 1930s Chicago tradition as evidenced in his own lecture notes, and in the written 
record, was grounded in a traditional, essentially, as he saw it, Fisherian, version of the 
quantity theory.1 More controversially, he also suggested that Friedman's (1956) 
"Restatement" bore more resemblance to Keynes' theory of liquidity preference than to 
earlier Chicago analysis, thus shifting a debate about economics in the 1930s towards the 
centre of what would soon become the highly charged "monetarist" controversy of the 
1970s. This journey was completed in (1971) when Harry Johnson went considerably 
beyond Patinkin in pronouncing the "Chicago tradition" a "fabrication" designed by 
Friedman, "as if" to promote his own "monetarist counter-revolution", an unfortunate ad 
hominem attack that distracted attention from the perceptive analysis of the nature of 
"scientific revolutions" in economics that lay at the centre of Johnson's paper.  
 The climax of this debate was a (1974) exchange between Patinkin and Friedman 
that settled some matters of genuine historical substance.2  First of all, Friedman (1974) 
no longer defended his 1956 "'restatement' as 'giving the flavor of the oral tradition' at 
Chicago in the sense that the details of my formal structure have precise counterparts in 
the teachings of Simons and Mints"; indeed he asserted that Patinkin "has made a real 
contribution to the history of economic thought by examining and presenting the detailed 
theoretical teachings of Simons and Mints, and I have little quarrel with his presentation" 
(p. 167), but of course Patinkin had identified the theoretical basis of monetary 
economics at Chicago in the 1930s as being in a then widely known quantity theory 
tradition, rather than in any locally unique version of the doctrine.3 It was, in short, 
agreed by all concerned in 1974 that the theoretical basis of the Chicago tradition lay in 
"well-known classical and early neo-classical analysis" (Ahiakpor, abstract), a fact that 
explains why, in (2002), we did not go into these origins, and also perhaps why Friedman 
did not bring them up in his correspondence with us about our work.  
 Friedman's (1974) concessions to his critics stopped here, however. He proceeded 
to argue that, though the Chicago department of the 1930s had not after all developed a 
unique approach to monetary theory, it had nevertheless been the home of constructive 
and even optimistic policy analysis related to the causes and potential cures of the Great 
Depression. This analysis, he told his readers, was grounded in the quantity theory and 
had helped render the Department proof against the onset of the Keynesian revolution 
later in the decade, and it had also anticipated many of the ideas about the same topics 
subsequently developed in The Monetary History of the United States (Friedman and 
                                                 
1 We suspect that the long gestation period of Patinkin's comments is related to the fact that the first edition 
of his Money Interest and Prices was also published in 1956, and generated a considerable controversy 
which did not begin to abate until the appearance of its second edition in 1965. The defense and then 
revision of this work must surely have had the first claim on Patinkin's time over these years. 
 
2 The influence of J. Ronnie Davis's (1968) analysis of the fiscal policy ideas of Chicago economists on the 
early stages of this controversy should also be mentioned here, perhaps. Friedman (1974) pays more than 
passing attention to them. 
 
3 Robert Leeson (2003, Vol. 2, p. 484)  has suggested that Friedman's erroneous recollections of a Chicago 
version of the quantity theory conceived of as a theory of the demand for money might be explained by the 
fact that his own lecture notes from 1932 show that Lloyd Mints paid attention that year to Keynes' recently 
published Treatise on Money (1930) which embodied many elements of the Cambridge version of the 
quantity theory  tradition but also expounded a version of what, in the General Theory (1936), would 
become "liquidity preference" theory. 
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Anna J. Schwartz [1963]). In support of this claim, furthermore, Friedman cited more 
than enough literature to demonstrate that this "Chicago tradition" was indeed no 
"fabrication", a point that he made explicitly on his own behalf. (p.168) 
 Nevertheless, Friedman was, as Ahiakpor notes, careful to avoid claiming 
uniqueness for the 1930s Chicago tradition which he described in 1974.4 The earliest 
document he cited as epitomizing it was none other than the Harris Foundation Manifesto 
that figures so prominently in our current dispute with Ahiakpor, and it had twenty-four 
signatories, only twelve of whom had Chicago affiliations. And Friedman also told his 
readers that he had "done no exhaustive research on the policy views of the time of 
economists at other institutions" Others had begun such research by then, however, for 
example Thomas Humphrey (1971) and Patinkin (1973), and they had found some non-
Chicago writers whose works had expounded ideas about the causes and cures for the 
Depression similar to those emanating from Chicago. Notable among these was Lauchlin 
Currie, the first named author of the Memorandum with which our (2002) work mainly 
dealt. 5  Humphrey and Patinkin both noted, quite correctly, that Currie's works, 
                                                 
4 George Tavlas (1998) was less careful in this regard, as Ahiakpor notes, claiming greater degrees of 
uniqueness and homogeneity for the Chicago Tradition than we believe the evidence will bear, a position in 
which he has recently been followed by  Johan van Overtveldt (2007). Much of the trouble here stems from 
the fact that these authors classify Paul Douglas as an exponent of the quantity theory, and hence treat a 
1927 paper by him advocating fiscal policy funded by money creation as an early example of the Chicago 
tradition's contribution. However, as Laidler (1999, pp  225-227) has pointed out, the theoretical inspiration 
acknowledged by Douglas himself for this work was not the quantity theory of money, but the under-
consumptionist analysis of  William Foster and Waddill Catchings (e.g., 1923). Significantly, perhaps, 
though Douglas was present at the Harris Foundation conference, he did not sign its Manifesto.     
 
5 It was at this point in the story that research on the Chicago tradition began to cross the path of another 
project in the history of economic thought, namely the restoration of Currie's reputation as an important 
economist. As Sandilands (1990 and 2004) would recount in detail, after leaving Harvard in 1934 for a 
spectacular career in Washington, which saw him rise from a junior position in Jacob Viner's "Freshman 
Brain Trust" to become, in 1939, the first personal economic advisor ever to be appointed by a President of 
the United States, and then on the President's behalf to take charge of US – China economic relations 
during the War, Currie eventually fell foul of the anti-communist witch-hunts of the early post-war period. 
In 1949 he took up a World Bank position in Colombia and settled there, becoming at the same time 
something of an un-person in US academic circles. His publications were omitted from the "Classified 
Bibliography of Articles on Monetary Theory" compiled for the American Economic Association by 
Harlan M. Smith (1952)  with "constant advice" from Lloyd Mints, and his name was nowhere mentioned 
in Friedman and Schwartz (1963) despite the fact that in the early 1930s, according to a recent 
commentator (Frank Steindl, 1995), he came closer than anyone else to anticipating their interpretation of 
this episode, and despite his crucially important work at the Fed., not least in the preparation of the 1935 
Act of Congress that so thoroughly reformed that institution. Allan Meltzer (2003) does acknowledge 
Currie's contributions, and he also gets two mentions in Friedman and Schwartz's (1970) Monetary 
Statistics of the United States, but only as a pioneer in the construction of systematic time series data for the 
country's money stock. The restoration of his reputation had begun before the debate about the Chicago 
Tradition began, with the reprinting by Earl Hamilton,  Harry Johnson and Albert Rees of his 1934 JPE 
article on "The Failure of Monetary Policy to Prevent the Depression of 1929-32" in their Landmarks of 
Political Economy (1962) that celebrated the seventieth anniversary of the founding of the JPE, and the 
1968 publication of a new edition of his 1934 monograph The Supply and Control of Money in the United 
States, with a lengthy introduction by Karl Brunner (1968).  Even now, debate about Currie's political 
loyalties continues to impinge, unfairly we believe, on his scientific reputation (as also in the case of Harry 
Dexter White), as explained in James M Boughton and Sandilands (2003). 
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important and penetrating though they were, had (like everything else they discussed) 
been published later than the key Chicago publications to which Friedman had referred, 
for example the 1932  Manifesto, and  Jacob Viner (1933). Thus, though their work 
confirmed that the ideas associated with Friedman's Chicago tradition were not unique to 
that institution, local priorities in their development seemed to remain well established.  
 And yet the case for this, even in the light of what was known in 1974, was not 
quite conclusive. Currie had submitted a Ph.D thesis at Harvard in January 1931 which 
bore the title Bank Assets and Banking Theory, and that 1932 Manifesto had, after all, 
attracted twelve signatories from elsewhere. Curiosity about these loose ends helped 
prompt one of us (Laidler 1993) to look at the matter of Chicago's priorities more closely, 
and in due course a number of other facts that had up till then either gone un-noticed or at 
least underappreciated would emerge.  
 First: though Currie's (1934a) book was not a reprint of his 1931 thesis, at least 
one of its chapters, that had also been published in the JPE in (1933a) under the title "The 
Treatment of Credit in Contemporary Monetary Theory", was drawn from it, while his 
(1934b) JPE paper on "The Failure of Monetary Policy to Prevent the Depression of 
1929-32" seemed to be a revised version of another; second, the immediate theoretical 
influence on the policy analysis presented in Currie's thesis, to judge from the citations in 
the version of it submitted for the degree in 1931, appeared to be Ralph Hawtrey, whose 
assistant Currie had been during a visiting year at Harvard (1928-29), in which he had 
replaced Currie's intended Ph.D. supervisor Allyn Young who had migrated to a chair at 
the London School of Economics.6  These facts were enough to establish that, late 
publication notwithstanding, Currie had an unassailable claim as a co-pioneer of the 
policy ideas associated with Friedman's Chicago tradition, influenced not so much by 
Fisher's American version of the quantity-theory tradition, however, as by Hawtrey's 
development of its (albeit closely related) Cambridge version.7 
 And there were other facts to be pondered: namely, that the principal supervisor 
of Currie's thesis had been John H Williams, who had not only attended the 1932 Harris 
Foundation conference, signed its Manifesto, and even participated in drafting this 
                                                 
6 The process of restoring of Young's reputation from the neglect into which it fell after his sudden and 
premature death in London in 1929 has also overlapped with the debate about the Chicago Tradition. 
Thanks to the work of Charles Blitch (1995), Perry Mehrling (1997) and Sandilands and Mehrling (1999), 
it is now clear that by the later 1920s he was well on his way to becoming as influential a figure at Harvard 
as Frank Taussig, then still professionally active, though in his sixties, had been in earlier years. Young was 
a great admirer of Hawtrey's version of quantity-theoretic monetary analysis and had been instrumental in 
arranging his visiting year at Harvard. 
   
7 Currie was particularly keen to replace Fisher’s transactions version of the quantity equation by an 
income version that would be a better guide for the interpretation of monetary policy in the years before 
and during the Depression. To this end Currie (1933b) estimated the first means of payment series for the 
United States and its related income velocity. He made use of this work in Currie (1934b) where, like 
Hawtrey, he stressed the flows of money incomes and expenditures and showed how, in the presence of 
sticky wages, excessively restrictive monetary impulses could put the burden of adjustment on quantities. 
Hence he also criticised Hayek’s “neutral money principle” that called for price falls as the way to pass on 
increased productivity and maintain demand (1934b, pp. 184-86). Currie’s approach also differed from 
Fisher’s more mechanical view that fluctuations in money cause fluctuations in prices and that the problem 
could be solved if monetary policy could be conducted according to a simple price-stability rule (see 
Laidler 1999, pp. 183-86). 
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document, but who had also evidently played a sufficiently important part in that drafting 
to be asked to prepare a paper (Williams 1932) for inclusion in the Conference 
proceedings explaining its background and significance. Laidler (1993) emphasized this 
last fact, arguing that it pointed to the possibility of a direct Harvard (and indirect 
Hawtreyan) influence on the earliest publication cited by Friedman as embodying the 
essential message of the Chicago tradition. Laidler and Sandilands (2002) also stress the 
significance of Williams having been invited to prepare this paper, but Ahiakpor does not 
mention this important detail in commenting on their case.  
 Be that as it may, it is in just this narrow context that the Harvard Memorandum 
becomes significant. Before this document came to general light, the main demonstrable 
link between Williams' input to the Harris foundation conference and work going on at 
Harvard was his role in supervising Currie's Ph.D thesis, which had been completed a 
year earlier and seemed to expound some ideas in common with the Manifesto. This 
evidence was suggestive, to be sure, but still left it open to a skeptical commentator such 
as George Tavlas (1997, 1998) to deny any Harvard influence on Chicago and to suggest 
that Currie was, in any event, a "lone wolf" at Harvard, whose ideas were not 
representative of any more broadly based line of enquiry being followed there. The fact 
that the Memorandum had three authors immediately disposed of this last conjecture, 
while the timing of its completion and the many similarities between its substance and 
that of the Harris Manifesto increased the likelihood of there having been a Harvard 
influence on what Friedman had so long ago presented as an important document in the 
Chicago tradition.  
 As we noted in (2002) there is no explicit reference to the Memorandum or to its 
authors in the records of the Harris foundation conference, so this case is not quite 
conclusive, but it is surely more plausible than Ahiakpor's alternative: namely, that the 
timing of the completion of the two documents was co-incidental, and that the above-
mentioned similarities between them resulted from the application of a common analytic 
framework to the same policy situation by two groups of economists who were otherwise 
working quite independently of each other. That was our view in 2002, and evidently 
Friedman found it persuasive. We see no reason to retreat from it now.     
 
(ii) Forced Saving and the Quantity Theory Tradition 
 
We have already expressed our agreement with Ahiakpor that, lying behind the policy 
analysis of both the Harvard Memorandum and the Chicago Manifesto was a long 
heritage of quantity theoretic reasoning. We also acknowledge that he has made a 
positive contribution to our understanding of how this heritage was transmitted and 
enhanced in the United States by drawing attention to the influence of Frank Taussig, a 
leading figure in the Harvard Department for many years. Taussig's importance is already 
well understood by students of the history of balance of payments theory, thanks to the 
work of June Flanders (1989, Ch 12), but Laidler (1999, Part  III)) was surely remiss in 
ignoring him in his discussion of macroeconomic thought in the inter-war United States.  
 Significantly in the current context, Flanders refers to Taussig and his students as 
"late classicals" explicitly linking their analysis to that of Hume, Ricardo, Mill and 
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Thornton among others.8 But quantity theoretic monetary theory was an integral part of 
their approach to balance of payments problems, and this aspect of Taussig's influence on 
what would later become known as the "Chicago tradition" has surely received 
insufficient attention. He was, after all, the Ph.D supervisor of, among others, Ellsworth, 
Williams, and White, who figure so prominently in the specific story under discussion in 
this paper, while Currie took his courses and had ongoing personal contact with him 
while a student. And Taussig was also the supervisor of Jacob Viner, who is universally 
acknowledged to have been a leader in the development of monetary thought at Chicago 
from the early 1930s onwards. Perhaps, then, that department's "tradition" had even 
deeper Harvard roots than Laidler (1993, 1999) suggested.    
 This being said, we are troubled by Ahiakpor's systematically misleading use of 
the term "forced saving" in his discussion of the above-mentioned quantity-theoretic 
heritage.9 This misuse raises not just semantic questions, but issues of substance too, 
because, as we shall now argue, the concept of forced saving as deployed by the so-called 
"Austrians", for example by Friedrich von Hayek (1931 [1935], 1932, 1933), played a 
pivotal role in making a theoretical case against the very kind of expansionary policies 
espoused both by Currie and his co-authors and by the signatories of the Chicago 
Manifesto. These Austrian ideas were expounded at the Harris Foundation conference by 
Gottfried von Haberler, and, even more significant for the later debate about the Chicago 
tradition, Friedman (1974) would discuss them in the following terms: "It was the 
London School (really Austrian) view that I referred to in my "Restatement" when I 
spoke of 'the atrophied and rigid caricature’ [of the quantity theory] that is so frequently 
described by the proponents of the new income-expenditure approach – and with some 
justice, to judge by much of the literature on policy that was spawned by the quantity 
theorists. The intellectual climate at Chicago had been wholly different" (p. 163): - to 
which we would add, judging from the Memorandum and Currie's other work of the 
period, at Harvard too.10 
 Now Friedman's characterization of Austrian theory itself as a version of the 
quantity theory of money was surely inappropriate in the light of the Austrians' own 
explicitly expressed doubts about the adequacy of the latter (See, e.g. Hayek (1931, 
[1935], pp. 3 – 8), but it is certainly the case that the analysis of forced saving which was 
central to their theory of economic crises had begun as an offshoot of quantity-theoretic 
work. Crucially, however, this forced saving idea is not the doctrine to which Ahiakpor 
affixes the label. For him, what he calls "the forced saving mechanism" is synonymous 
with "the lagged adjustment of wages behind prices" (p.10), or, more extensively "the 
forced saving mechanism – the lagged adjustment of wage rates, interest rates, and rental 
                                                 
8 Flanders (p. 241-243) errs in including James Angell, whose supervisor was Allyn Young, among 
Taussig's students, though like Currie, Angell was undoubtedly exposed to Taussig's teaching.   
 
9 We believe that misuse of this term also mars another recent paper by Ahiakpor (2009) on the history of 
Phillips curve analysis, but further discussion of  this suggestion here would take us too far beyond the 
bounds of this paper to be feasible. 
 
10 Friedman's reference to the "London School" must be read in the light of the fact that in this passage he 
was discussing the contrast between what he had learned at Chicago in the early 1930s and what Abba 
Lerner had learned in the same years at LSE where the economic analysis of the Depression was of course 
dominated by Hayek and Robbins (1934). 
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rates behind changes in the price level – . . . produces the short-term effects on output and 
employment from variations in the quantity of money and credit." (p.3) This usage leads 
him to link together as exponents of the forced saving doctrine a long line of 
acknowledged quantity theorists stretching from David Hume – "There is always an 
interval before matters be adjusted to their new situation; and this interval is as pernicious 
to industry, when gold and silver [money] are diminishing, as it is advantageous when 
these metals are increasing" (1752, as quoted by Ahiakpor, p. 13)  to Frank Taussig  - 
"That wages go up more slowly than prices is one of the best attested facts in economic 
history . . . To the extent that prices of commodities advance faster than expenses for the 
labor [employers] buy, the payers of wages gain . . " (Taussig (1921 pp. 298-9), as quoted 
by Ahiakpor, p. 7).11  
 The trouble is that the passages Ahiakpor quotes here express not the forced-
saving doctrine as it has usually been understood, but what sometimes is called the 
"wage-lag hypothesis" and indeed at two points in his paper, Ahiakpor recognizes that 
there might be some debate about treating these two ideas as if they were the same. Thus 
he acknowledges (fn. 4) that "Some modern analysts tend to separate the lagged wage 
adjustment behind product prices from classical forced-saving doctrine, e.g. Humphrey 
(1982), Hansson (1987) and Laidler (1991; 1993; & 1999)",  but, he immediately goes 
on, "See Hayek (1933, 218-19n) for some identification of the equivalence," and he 
claims that “Ahiakpor (2009) further explains the equivalence.”  He also warns his 
readers (fn.13) that "Some analysts, including some previous referees, do not recognize 
the forced-saving mechanism in Hume's monetary analysis." But he then assures them 
that "I here follow David Ricardo's (4: 36) lead in doing so. See also F. A. Hayek (1931, 
9) and Eric Roll (1938, 103)".  Ahiakpor (p.7) also cites Hayek (1931, p.25n)  as 
recognizing Taussig's claims to be an exponent of the forced saving doctrine on the 
strength of those sections of his textbook (Taussig, 1921) from which the quotation noted 
above is taken – specifically Chapter 22, especially sections 5-6  (pp. 294-301)  
 Now even today, Hayek is acknowledged to be a, perhaps the, leading authority 
on the early development of the forced saving doctrine.12 Thus, Ahiakpor seems at first 
sight to have considerable scholarly authority behind the terminology he adopts, and the 
intellectual links he makes. In fact, however, the Hayekian sources he cites offer him no 
support at all. The footnote in Hayek (1933, pp. 218-19n) which is said to "offer some 
equivalence" between lagged wage adjustment and the forced saving doctrine does 
nothing of the sort; it sets out a highly abbreviated history of the early development of the 
forced-saving doctrine based on Hayek (1932) and makes no mention of lagged wage 
                                                 
 
11 The attentive reader will note that we here abbreviate the passages that Ahiakpor quotes, without we 
hope affecting the argument in any way. 
12 As Ahiakpor notes in his fn. 4, citing Viner (1937, p. 188) as his authority. The article which Viner in 
turn cites is, of course, Hayek (1932). However, in his own review of the early nineteenth century 
Bullionist controversy, in the same book, Viner explicitly distinguished two forms of the argument that “an 
increase in the quantity of money operates to increase employment and prosperity”. The first was the newly 
introduced “forced-saving” doctrine in which investment is increased at the expense of those on fixed 
incomes; the second was the argument that “commodity prices do not rise immediately or do not rise in as 
great proportion as the increase in money, and the money left over is available for additional expenditures 
and consequently for the employment of additional labor. This form of the doctrine, of course, was not 
novel, but goes back to Hume… and rests on the assumption that there are idle resources.”  
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adjustment. The passage in Hayek (1931, p. 9) that is said to recognize the presence of 
the forced-saving doctrine in Hume's analysis discusses the effects of lagging wages on 
output when prices are rising, but makes no use of the term forced saving (and in any 
case seems not to recognize that Hume was actually discussing the likelihood, if gold 
flows into a country due to a payments surplus, that wages would rise before a rise in 
prices); and Hayek's citation of Taussig in (1931, p. 25, fn), to which Ahiakpor explicitly 
refers, is to page 351 (Ch. 25) that book, where forced saving is indeed discussed, and to  
page 359 where it is not (see however, p. 399). Hayek's citation is not to the passages in 
Taussig - pages 294-301 - on which Ahiakpor focuses - where the wage-lag hypothesis 
alone is discussed.  
             Nor do the passages in the writings of David Ricardo (1815) and Eric Roll (1995) 
that Ahiakpor invokes serve his case any better. To the extent that there is anything 
relevant to the current discussion to be found on page 36 of  Volume 4 of Ricardo's 
Works and Correspondence – the passage in question occurs in his 1815 "Essay on 
Profits" which is concerned with the effects of variations in the relative price of corn on 
profits - it might be the following: "Mr Malthus notices an observation, which was first 
made by Hume, that a rise in prices has a magic effect on industry: he states the effects of 
a fall to be equally depressing."  As to Roll's (1995, p. 103) discussion, which seems to 
have remained unchanged since the first (1938) edition of his book, this revolves around 
the following quotations from Hume: "It is only in this interval or intermediate situation, 
between the acquisition of money and rise of prices, that the increasing quantity of gold 
and silver is favourable to industry" and "[the increase of money] will quicken the 
diligence of every individual, before it encrease the price of labour". Roll interprets 
Hume as here describing "what Keynes later called a profit inflation which was taking 
place at the expense of labour",  but Morris Perlman (1987) has argued persuasively that 
the word "labour" in the above quotation from Hume should be read as meaning "the 
output of labour" which would invalidate Roll's interpretation. In any event, none of this 
has anything to do with forced saving.  
          Even so, elsewhere in the specific works of Hayek to which Ahiakpor refers, there 
are extensive discussions of forced saving: of the term's meaning, of the origins of the 
doctrine which it signifies, and of that doctrine's apparent implications for both theory 
and policy. Thus in the very passage of Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle (1933) to 
which the above-mentioned footnote (pp. 218-19n.) is attached, Hayek writes as follows:  
". . . the phenomenon of  'forced saving '. . . has received a great deal of attention in 
recent literature. This phenomenon, we are led to understand, consists in an increase in 
capital creation at the cost of consumption, through the granting of additional credit, 
without voluntary action on the part of the individuals who forgo consumption, and 
without deriving any immediate benefits" (pp 218-9, italics in original). Or as he 
describes the same theory of forced saving - again he deploys the term explicitly - more 
succinctly in Prices and Production (1931 [1935], p.18), "… an increase in money brings 
about an increase in capital." And in both places, Hayek identifies the doctrine's 
originators as Jeremy Bentham, who finished writing the relevant passage in 1804, 
though it was not published until 1843, Henry Thornton (1802), and particularly Thomas 
Malthus (1811) to whom he accords "The honour of first having discussed the problem in 
some detail in print . . .with the complaint that no writer he is acquainted with 'has ever 
seemed sufficiently aware of the influence which a different distribution of the circulating 
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medium of the country must have on those accumulations which are destined to aid future 
production'" (p. 19). There is no hint here, nor in any of Hayek's other writings of the 
period (1932, 1933), at a Humean origin for this doctrine, or at any equivalence to the 
wage-lag doctrine that he had discussed only a few pages earlier.  
 Given the amount of attention that Ahiakpor pays to Frank Taussig, it is worth 
pointing out that he also refers (p.7) to a passage in Dennis Robertson's Banking Policy 
and the Price Level (1926, p. 52) in support of his own attribution of the forced-saving 
idea to Taussig which, as we have seen, he bases on a passage from (1921, pp. 298-99). 
Robertson there quotes, with abbreviations, a brief passage that appears on p. 351 of this 
edition of Taussig's book, which is nowhere near pp. 298-99. This passage, presumably 
the one to which Hayek (1931) also refers (see above), reads: ". . . so far as deposits are 
created by the banks . . . money means are created, and the command of capital is 
supplied, without any cost or sacrifice on the part of any saver".  This is indeed a version 
of the forced saving doctrine, though Robertson, himself an exponent of an unusually 
subtle analysis of the phenomenon under the label "imposed lacking", found it "far too 
sweeping".13    
 It is not Robertson's deployment of the forced-saving idea in the mid-1920s that is 
crucial to matters under discussion here, however, but that of the Austrians, including 
Hayek, in the early 1930s. As we have already noted, they were deeply skeptical of the 
adequacy of quantity theoretic reasoning of the type that underlay both the Harvard 
Memorandum and the Harris Manifesto, (see e.g. Hayek 1931 [1935], pp. 1-7); and they 
also vigorously opposed the sort of expansionary monetary policies that were advocated 
in both documents – "well meaning but dangerous proposals to fight depression by 'a 
little inflation'" as Hayek famously termed such recommendations (1931 [1935], p. 
125).14  Crucially, Austrian skepticism on these points derived from a particular 
application of the forced-saving doctrine (as properly understood) to the analysis of the 
business cycle. As Hayek explained (1933, pp. 218-226), early exponents of the doctrine 
had tended to treat the process of capital accumulation to which forced saving gave rise 
as benign, or even helpful in achieving well balanced economic growth, inasmuch as it 
tended to drive down the Wicksellian "natural rate of interest", but the Austrians, 
beginning with Ludwig von Mises (1913) took a very different view, namely that: "it is 
probably more proper to regard forced saving as the cause of economic crises than to 
expect it to restore a balanced structure of production."  (Hayek 1933, p. 226 italics in 
original)   
                                                 
13  Robertson locates the relevant passage on p 357, with no edition specified, but it does appear on p. 357 
of Taussig's second (1915) edition.  The key point here, however, is that the passage in question is 
unrelated to Taussig's discussion of the wage-lag doctrine on which Ahiakpor himself focuses. Of course, 
forced-saving theory usually does require someone to make an involuntary sacrifice of current consumption 
when investments are financed through credit creation, and it is true as well that an economy that is subject 
to wage lags may also be subject to such a process.  But wage lags are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
forced saving to occur. 
 
14 In an otherwise sympathetic review of Currie’s 1934 book – he was particularly complimentary about the 
chapter on confusions between money and credit that had also appeared as Currie (1933) - Robertson 
(1935) worried about a potentially dangerous “inflation-bacillus” in Currie’s blood that coloured his outline 
of an “ideal” plan for more effective, centralised monetary control – with 100 percent reserves required 
against demand deposits – to deal with the problem of cyclical fluctuations. 
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 To put the analytic basis of this view succinctly, the Austrians believed that the 
capital accumulation generated by forced saving would be accompanied by a growing 
excess demand for current consumption goods and a correspondingly expanding capacity 
to supply future consumption goods that no one wanted, and that it could only be kept 
going by a rising and ultimately unsustainable rate of credit creation by the banking 
system. When such an inflationary boom came to its inevitable end, a crisis would ensue 
whose essential characteristics would include an excessive stock of capital, some of it 
embodied in uncompleted projects, and an excess demand for consumption goods as well. 
Hence, policies designed to stimulate demand in the wake of such a crisis could only 
make matters worse, and were to be eschewed while the passage of time restored 
equilibrium to the time-structure of production.  
 In short, in the early 1930s, far from forming the centre-piece of a quantity-
theoretic tradition from which the case for the expansionary policies recommended in 
both the Harvard Memorandum and the Harris Manifesto derived, the forced-saving 
doctrine, as properly interpreted, lay at the very heart of a body of theoretical and policy 
doctrine that was root-and-branch opposed to all that these documents represented in the 
monetary economics of the time. Ahiakpor's misuse of the term, and his consequent 
misinterpretation of the doctrine that it characterizes, obscure this all-important fact, and 
are not minor matters.            
 
(iii) Constructive Policy Proposals and Others 
             
At one point in his paper, Ahiakpor claims that "Hume's analysis . . .provides the basic 
framework for a remedial policy formulation in the case of a commercial crisis of the 
type experienced during the Great Depression" (p. 14). This is surely going too far. Had it 
been that easy, there would have been little need for the Bullionist and Currency School-
Banking School controversies, not to mention those later debates in the course of which 
the theories of money, banking and central banking as they stood by the end of World 
War 1, had developed.15  Nevertheless such remedial policy recommendations do indeed 
weave in and out of the monetary literature, if not from the mid 18th century onwards, 
certainly from the very beginning of the nineteenth. More often than not, however, they 
were a minority taste among exponents of the evolving monetary orthodoxy of the 
following century and a quarter. Of no place and time is this more true than of the United 
States at the onset of the Great Depression, and Ahiakpor's failure to grasp this fact 
contributes to his underestimation of the importance of the Harvard Memorandum, and of 
the Harris Manifesto too. 
 At that time, the Austrians had a new theory with which to justify the case against 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, and this was making their work particularly 
attractive to and influential among academic economists. But the anti-activist policy 
position itself long antedated their new theory, and it resonated much more broadly too, 
among bankers and policy makers, many of whom had probably never heard of forced 
saving and would have cared little about the theoretical significance of the concept if they 
had.  It derived from what is often called a "banking school" tradition that is almost as 
                                                 
15 Any reader tempted to accept Ahiakpor's suggestion that we "overlooked the classical and early 
neoclassical source from which Currie and his co-authors drew their insights" (p. 20) might consult Laidler 
(1991 and  2000) as guides to these sources alternative to the one he provides.  
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venerable as the quantity theory of money, and whose exponents often made the so-called 
"real-bills" or "needs of trade" doctrine a central feature of their work.16 Important in the 
current context, this theory of monetary policy had become the dominant one in the 
United States in the wake of the bimetallic controversy of the 1880s and 90s, and, under 
the influence of James Laurence Laughlin, the founding chairman of the Chicago 
economics department, and with direct input from Laughlin's sometime Chicago Ph.D. 
student Henry Parker Willis, it had even become embodied in the Federal Reserve Act of 
1913.17  
 The essential feature of this doctrine was the proposition that a monetary policy 
that ensured that the supplies of money and credit responded with elasticity to the "needs 
of trade" would always be stabilizing, and as a corollary that became centrally important 
in the early years of the depression, that efforts actively to expand money and credit 
beyond the needs of trade might affect prices, but do nothing for the performance of the 
real economy.  
 So dominant had this view become in the United States in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century that Irving Fisher characterized his now famous monograph The 
Purchasing Power of Money (1911) as an effort to rehabilitate its then widely discredited 
quantity-theoretic rival, and he treated Laughlin's work as a foil for his own. Though 
Fisher's arguments made some headway among academics in the 1920s, and though 
advocates of "credit control" – an approach to monetary policy that involved its 
deployment as an active tool of stabilization – such as Allyn Young even got a hearing 
for their ideas within the Federal Reserve System, the "needs of trade" doctrine 
nevertheless remained dominant there and in financial circles more generally. As 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Meltzer (2003) have thoroughly documented, 
moreover, this doctrine provided the intellectual underpinning for the usually passive 
policy stance taken by the Federal Reserve at the time at which the Harvard 
Memorandum and the Harris Manifesto were prepared.  
 Laughlin, by then in his '80s and long retired from the Chicago department, 
provided a particularly clearcut statement of the doctrine and its implications for 
contemporary policy issues in his1933 book The Federal Reserve Act: its Origins and 
Problems: "Perhaps the commonest fallacy is that the more of the medium of exchange 
issued by a public authority, the greater the purchasing power of the people, the greater 
the demand for goods and the higher the level of prices . . . [I]n reality demand comes 
from other goods, before money or credit enter on the scene " (1933 pp. 219-220), so that 
"to increase the medium of exchange as a remedy when there are less goods to be 
exchanged is fatuous." (p. 285) Though Willis (1932) did not express himself quite as 
                                                 
 
16 Lloyd C. Mints (1945), surely one of the most distinguished products of the Chicago Tradition under 
discussion in this paper, remains a classic source on the historical development of this doctrine, and 
alternatives to it. Note however, that not all those who have been classified as members of the Banking 
School by Mints and others were also committed to the real bills doctrine. On this matter, see Neil Skaggs 
(forthcoming). Exponents of this doctrine often failed to distinguish clearly between credit and money, and 
such confusion often lay at the roots of their support for essentially passive monetary policy. This is the 
main theme explored and clarified in Currie's (1933) quantity-theoretic treatment of these issues. 
 
17 On the importance of such views in the debate that preceded the founding of the Federal Reserve System 
in 1913, see Robert Dimand (2003). 
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bluntly at the Harris conference, this was nevertheless the message he conveyed, and he 
spoke for a majority of policy makers and men of influence when he did so. 
 The historical importance of both the Harvard Memorandum and the Harris 
Manifesto (and of a number of other documents circulating at around the same time) lay 
not just in the quality of the intellectual effort that went into deriving policy proposals for 
the times from a long-standing intellectual tradition of quantity-theoretic work, but in the 
fact that those proposals laid out specific and positive plans of action for dealing with the 
then accelerating downturn. Moreover, and crucially, these plans were, in the words that 
Friedman (1974) would later use to characterize the Manifesto and subsequent Chicago 
work too, "hopeful and relevant" in contrast to the "dismal picture" implicit in an 
alternative view that "the only sound policy was to let the depression run its course, bring 
down money costs, and eliminate weak and unsound firms." (p. 163) 
 In the early 1930s, hope and relevance were thus important qualities in their own 
right, but because their importance was enhanced when they were married to coherent 
economic analysis, departments of economics whose members could provide a 
combination of all these qualities were likely to prosper intellectually. That is why we 
still believe that Harvard did itself no good when it let Currie, White and Ellsworth leave, 
while retaining the nevertheless distinguished authors of The Economics of the Recovery 
Program (Brown et al, 1934). Despite Ahiakpor's attempts to defend the latter work, we 
still find it unimpressive. This is not just because its most coherent chapter, that prepared 
by the then recently appointed Joseph Schumpeter, was devoted to expounding an 
Austrian-style case for policy passivity, but because, as Ahiakpor himself acknowledges, 
its contributors as a whole were content to pick holes in the "Recovery Program" in 
question without feeling the need to "suggest measures of remedial policy. We do not see 
any force in the question: What remedies have you yourselves to offer? Analysis and 
criticism have their place independently of the existence or nature of alternative 
proposals." (1934, p.xii, as quoted by Ahiakpor fn. 1) Perhaps they do have their place, 
but in the middle of the Great Depression, when the economic and political situation was 
crying out for just such alternative proposals, the place in question was surely a rather 
humble and obscure one reserved for the mediocre.  
 Small wonder, then, that the Harvard department whose own remaining members 
after 1934 had no positive ideas to offer about the central economic questions of the day 
would soon succumb to those who did, namely the young Keynesians led by Alvin 
Hansen who would quickly come to dominate it after 1936. Whether this was for good or 
ill, however, and whether Harvard economics developed along more or less constructive 
lines than did the Chicago version in the late 1930s and 1940s are questions that we are 





Ahiakpor, James C. W. 2009. The Phillips Curve Analysis: An Illustration of the 
 Classical Forced-Saving Doctrine. Journal of the History of Economic Thought 
 31 (June): 143-160. 
 
 14
-----------------------. 2010. On the Similarities between the 1932 Harvard  Memorandum 
and the Chicago Anti-Depression Recommendations. History of Political Economy  
(this issue). 
 
Bentham, Jeremy. 1804 (1843). The Works of Jeremy Bentham (published under the 
 superintendence of his executor, John Bowring) Vol. III,  Manual of Political 
 Economy. Edinburgh: W. Tait. 
 
Blitch Charles P. 1995. Allyn Young: the Peripatetic Economist. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Boughton, James M. and Roger J. Sandilands. 2003. Politics and the Attack on FDR’s 
Economists: From Grand Alliance to Cold War. Intelligence and National Security 
18:3 (Autumn): 73-99. 
 
Brown, Douglass V. et al. 1934. The Economics of the Recovery Program. Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Brunner, Karl. 1968. On Lauchlin Currie’s Contribution to Monetary Theory. 
Introductory material to The Supply and Control of Money in the United States, by 
L. Currie [1934a], ix-xxxv. New York: Russell &  Russell.   
 
Currie, Lauchlin. 1931. Bank Assets and Banking Theory. Ph.D. diss., Harvard 
University. 
 
--------------------. 1933a. The treatment of credit in contemporary monetary theory. 
Journal of Political Economy 41.1 (February): 509-25. 
 
-------------------. 1933b. Money, Gold, and Incomes in the United States, 1921-32. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 48 (November): 77-95. 
 
-------------------. 1934a. The Supply and Control of Money in the United States. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
-------------------. 1934b. The failure of monetary policy to prevent the depression of 
1929-32. Journal of Political Economy 42.2 (April): 145-77. Reprinted in Earl J. 
Hamilton, Albert Rees and Harry G. Johnson (eds.). 1962. Landmarks in Political 
Economy. Chicago: Chicago University Press: 168-98. 
 
 15
-----------------. 1978. Comments and Observations. History of Political Economy 10.4 
(Winter): 541-548  
 
-----------------, Paul. T. Ellsworth and Harry D. White. 1932 [2002]. Memorandum. 
History of Political Economy, 34:3 (Fall): 533-552. 
 
Davis J. Ronnie. 1968. Chicago Economists, Deficit Budgets, and the Early 1930s. 
American Economic Review 58 (June): 476-82.  
 
Dimand, Robert. 2003. Competing Visions for the U.S. Monetary System, 1907-1913: 
The Quest for an Elastic Currency and the Rejection of Fisher's Compensated 
Dollar Rule for Price Stability. Cahiers d'Economie Politique 35 (Autumn): 191-
121. 
 
Douglas, Paul H. 1927. The Modern Technique of Mass Production and Its Relation to 
Wages. Proceedings of the American Academy of Political Science 12 (3) 
Stabilizing Business (July): 17-42. 
 
Flanders, M. June. 1989. International Monetary Economics 1870-1960: Between the 
classical and the new classical. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Foster, William T. and Waddill Catchings. 1923. Money. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.  
 
Friedman, Milton. 1956. The Quantity Theory of Money - a Restatement, in Studies in 
the Quantity Theory of Money. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
------------------. 1974. Comments on the Critics. In Milton Friedman’s Monetary 
Framework, edited by Robert J. Gordon, 132-77. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
----------------- and Anna J. Schwartz. 1963. A Monetary History of the United States, 
1867-1960. Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University Press. 
 
---------------------------------. 1970. The Monetary Statistics of the United States: 
Estimates, Sources, Methods. New York: NBER.  
 
 16
Haberler, Gottfried von. 1932. Money and the Business Cycle. In Gold and Monetary 
Stabilization: Lectures on the Harris Foundation, ed. Quincy Wright. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hamilton, Earl J., Albert Rees, and Harry G. Johnson (eds.). 1962. Landmarks in 
Political Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hansson, Bjorn. 1987 Forced Saving. In The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Hayek, Friedrich. A. von. 1931 [2nd revised ed., 1935]. Prices and Production. London: 
Routledge. 
 
------------------------------. 1932. A Note on the Development of the Doctrine of ‘Forced 
Saving’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 47 (November): 123-33. 
 
------------------------------.   1933.  Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle. (tr. N. Kaldor 
and H. Croome), as reprinted, New York: Augustus M. Kelley 1966. 
 
Hume, David. 1752.  Political Discourses. Edinburgh: A. Kinkaid and A. Donaldson.  
 
Humphrey, Thomas M. 1971. Role of Non-Chicago Economists in the Evolution of the 
Quantity Theory in America, 1930-1950. Southern Economic Journal 38 (July): 12-
18.   
 
-----------------------------. 1982. Of Hume, Thornton, the Quantity Theory and the Phillips  
 Curve. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review 54 (November, 
December): 13-18. 
 
Johnson, Harry G. 1971. The Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist Counter-
Revolution. American Economic Review, 61 (May, papers and proceedings): 1-14. 
 
Keynes, John Maynard. 1930  A Treatise on Money. London: Macmillan. 
 
----------------------------- 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
London: Macmillan.   
 




------------------. 1993. Hawtrey, Harvard and the Origins of the Chicago Tradition. 
Journal of Political Economy 101 (Dec.): 1068-1103. 
 
-----------------. 1999 Fabricating the Keynesian Revolution: Studies of the Inter-war 
Literature on Money, the Cycle and Unemployment. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press. 
 
 ----------------. 2000. Highlights of the Bullionist Controversy.  Research Report No. 13. 
Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics, Institutet for Economisk Historisk 
Forskning. 
 
Laidler, David and Roger. J. Sandilands. 2002. An Early Harvard Memorandum on Anti-
Depression Policies: An Introductory Note. History of Political Economy, 34:3 (Fall): 
515-532. 
 
Laughlin, James. L. 1933 The Federal Reserve Act, Its Origins and Problems. New York: 
Macmillan. 
 
Malthus, Thomas. M. 1811. Review of David Ricardo's High Price of Bullion.  Edinburgh 
Review Vol, XVII, No. XXXIV. 
 
Meltzer, Allan H. 2003. A History of the Federal Reserve. Vol. 1, 1913-1951. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
 
Mehrling, Perry G. 1997. The Money Interest and the Public Interest: American 
Monetary Thought 1920-1970. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 
 
------------- and Roger J. Sandilands (eds.). 1999. Money and Growth: Selected Papers of 
Allyn Abbott Young. London: Routledge. 
 
Mints, Lloyd W. 1945. History of Banking Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Mises, Ludwig von. 1912. Theorie des Geldes und der Umlaufsmittel (1st ed.). Second 
revised ed., translated by H. E. Batson as The Theory of Money and Credit, 
London, Jonathan Cape 1924. 
 
Patinkin Don. 1969. The Chicago Tradition, the Quantity Theory and Friedman. Journal 
of Money, Credit, and Banking 1 (Feb.): 46-70. 
 18
  
----------------.  1973. More on the Chicago Monetary Tradition. Southern Economic 
Journal 39 (Jan.): 454-459. 
 
Perlman, Morris, 1987. Of a Controversial Passage in Hume. Journal of Political 
Economy  95.2 (April): 274-89. 
 
Ricardo, David. 1815. An Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn on the Profits of 
Stock. As reprinted, pp. 1 – 41, in P. Sraffa (ed.) The Works and Correspondence of 
David Ricardo Vol. IV (Pamphlets and Papers, 1815-1823). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press for the Royal Economic Society, 1951.    
 
Robbins, Lionel C. 1934. The Great Depression. London: Macmillan. 
  
Robertson, Dennis H. 1926. Banking Policy and the Price Level. As preprinted, New 
York: Augustus Kelley, 1960.  
 
--------------------. 1935. Review of L. B. Currie: The Supply and Control of Money in the 
United States. Economic Journal 45 (March): 128-131. 
 
Roll, Eric. 1992. A History of Economic Thought (5th revised ed.). London and Boston: 
Faber and Faber. 
 
Sandilands Roger. J. 1990. The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie: New 
Dealer, Presidential Adviser and Development Economist Durham, NC.: Duke 
University Press. 
 
-------------------------. 2004. Editor’s Introduction to ‘New Light on Lauchlin Currie’s 
Monetary Economics in the New Deal and Beyond’. Journal of Economic Studies 
31:3/4: 170-93. 
 
Skaggs, Neil. Forthcoming. Less than an Ideal Type: Varieties of Real Bills Doctrines. 
 
Smith, Harlan M. 1952. Classified Bibliography of Articles on Monetary Theory. in   
 F. A Lutz and L. W. Mints (eds., for the American Economic Association) 
Readings in Monetary Theory. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
 19
 
Steindl, Frank G. 1995. Monetary Interpretations of the Great Depression. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
 
Taussig, Frank W. 1921. Principles of Economics Vol. 1 (third ed., revised). New York: 
Macmillan. 
 
Tavlas George S. 1997. Chicago, Harvard and the Doctrinal Foundations of Monetary 
Economics. Journal of Political Economy 105 (Feb.): 153-177. 
 
--------------------. 1998. Retrospectives: Was the Monetarist Tradition Invented? Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 12:4 (Fall): 211-222. 
 
Thornton, Henry. 1802. An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of 
Great Britain. London: J. Hatchard. 
 
Van Overtveldt, Johan. 2007. The Chicago School.  Chicago: Agate Publishing Inc. 
 
Viner Jacob. 1933. Balanced Deflation, Inflation or More Depression? Minneapolis: 
Univ. of Minnesota Press. 
 
----------------. 1936 Studies in the Theory of International Trade. New York: Harper 
Row. 
 
Williams John. H. 1932. Monetary Stability and the Gold Standard. In Gold and 
Monetary Stabilization: Lectures on the Harris Foundation ed. Quincy Wright. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
  
Willis, Henry Parker. 1932  Federal Reserve Policy in Depression. In Gold and Monetary 
Stabilization: Lectures on the Harris Foundation, ed. Quincy Wright. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.  
